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Abstract
Purpose Although the term ‘‘responsibility’’ plays a
central role in bioethics and public health, its meaning
and implications are often unclear. This paper defends
the importance of a more systematic conception of
responsibility to improve moral philosophical as well
as descriptive analysis.
Methods We start with a formal analysis of the
relational conception of responsibility and its meta-
ethical presuppositions. In a brief historical overview,
we compare global-collective, professional, personal,
and social responsibility. The value of our analytical
matrix is illustrated by sorting out the plurality of
responsibility models in three cases (organ transplan-
tation, advance directives, and genetic testing).
Results Responsibility is a relational term involving
at least seven relata. The analysis of the relata allows
distinguishing between individual versus collective
agency, retrospective versus prospective direction,
andliabilityversuspowerrelations.Variousbioethical
ambiguities result from insufﬁcient, implicit, or inap-
propriate ascriptions of responsibility.
Conclusions A systematic conception of responsi-
bility is an important tool for bioethical reﬂection. It
allowsanin-depthunderstandingandcritiqueofmoral
claims on a meta-ethical level without presuming one
particular normative approach. Considering the con-
cept of responsibility can also help to complement the
current bioethical focus on individual autonomy by
including the perspectives of other actors, such as
family members or social groups.
Keywords Responsibility  Applied ethics 
Bioethics  Conception  History  Organ
transplantation  Advance directives  Genetic testing 
Personal versus social responsibility  Professional
responsibility
Introduction
The term ‘‘responsibility’’ has become an integral but
diverse element of bioethical and public health
debates. Thus, the promotion of responsible health
behavior constitutes a major effort of health care
policies in Europe and the United States. In the name
of ‘‘personal responsibility for health,’’ the US health
care reform proposes ‘‘cost-sharing options’’ that are
supposed to ‘‘reﬂect mainstream thinking’’ (Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services 2006: 4). Further-
more, there are heated debates about the responsibility
of the physician, for instance in the case of assisted
suicide. Recently, the German Medical Association
declared in its revised guidelines on end-of-life
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(Bundesa ¨rztekammer 2011: 346)—but there still
exists the physician’s ‘‘own responsibility in a con-
crete situation’’ (ibid.). A third example is the
UNESCO Declaration of Bioethics and Human
Rights. It states a ‘‘social responsibility’’ of societies
and governments regarding the ‘‘promotion of health
and social development for their people’’ (UNESCO
2005: Article 14).
These examples elucidate that ‘‘responsibility’’ is a
term in bioethics that appears everywhere—and at the
same time nowhere. No term has such an elusive role
andmultiplemeaning.Thismightbeareasonforsome
scholars to avoid its systematic use and not invest
much normative scrutiny. One of the most common
conceptions in applied medical ethics, the principlist
approach developed by Tom Beauchamp and James
Childress (2009), provides an excellent example. The
whole work has no particular chapter or paragraph
dealing with responsibility as a normative principle or
framework. Likewise, the Encyclopedia of Applied
Ethics (Callahan et al. 1997), another standard work in
medical ethics, lacks an entry on responsibility.
This lacuna points to a serious problem: ‘‘Respon-
sibility’’ is a key term in so many contexts related to
medicine, health care, and biotechnology that we
cannot afford to ignore or delude its meaning. Despite
thebroaduseof‘‘responsibility’’inempiricalpractice,
assuming that it is mainlya ‘‘practical’’ concept would
neglect its important theoretical dimension and tradi-
tion. However, rather than of offering one single
model of responsibility as a substantial normative
solutionfor all bioethical problems, we suggest to deal
with responsibilities (in plural). This means that there
are different models of responsibility, each of them
appropriate in particular contexts. Thus, instead of
dismissing ‘‘responsibility’’ as a ‘‘term non grata’’ for
bioethics, we consider its relational composition as
wellasthe pluralityinmodels ofresponsibilitytohave
an important analytical value for ethical reﬂection. By
acknowledging ‘‘responsibility’’ as a leading concept
for applied ethics, a more concrete approach and
more social relevance will be gained and the indivi-
dual dimension of the doctor–patient relationship can
easily be linked to the institutional as well as societal
level and the public health dimension.
By pursuing this line of argument, we aim at the
following: First, we provide a formal classiﬁcation of
various conceptions of responsibility, given that there
exists a lot of unsystematic or even rhetorical use of
the word. We use the term ‘‘conception’’ to refer to
formal, general ideas. This summary is based on a
systematicanalysisofdifferenttheoretical andapplied
works in philosophy and includes an analysis of
conditions as well as of contexts of application. We
explain how ‘‘responsibility’’ as a normative concept
is—on a meta-ethical level—distinguished from and
at the same time related to other formal ethical
principles, such as autonomy, justice, or non-maleﬁ-
cence. Secondly, we analyze the use of different
models of responsibility in bioethics in a descriptive
perspective. With models, we refer to particular
explanations and speciﬁc contexts. We identify three
stages of the use of responsibility within Western
bioethics since the late 1960s. These stages are based
on the following: a holistic model of global respon-
sibility, a model of professional responsibility, and a
model that focuses on the relation between the
individual and the community. We do not argue for
one particular model, but for the normative impor-
tance of an explication and differentiation of models,
preserving their diversity. The juxtaposition of these
models allows us to detect moral problems related to
power relations and normative inconsistencies and to
analyze limitations and one-sided usage of speciﬁc
models. In this sense, the ethical consideration of
responsibility can overcome limits of other common
approaches in applied ethics. Finally, we illustrate our
theoretical considerations with regard to different
ﬁelds of application. We demonstrate the hermeneutic
valueofsuchabroaderunderstandingofresponsibility
and show how ethical analysis can beneﬁt from taking
different models into account—those which are stated
explicitly, and those which are implicit or still
neglected. Once one has accepted that there are
different possible models, a discussion on the under-
lying subjects, norms, instances, and normative con-
sequences has to start.
Formal Analysis of Responsibility in Its Diversity
The following analysis divides into three dimensions:
First,thebasicnormativestructureofallresponsibility
models is disentangled by introducing a general
concept. This concept is a relational one: It is
described in a formula comprising a set of relations
between different positions (relata). Second, the
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123conditions and normative presumptions of the relata
are analyzed. Third, the fact is considered that
different norms and instances used as relata imply
different moral presuppositions and commitments.
The Structure of Responsibility: A Relational
Concept of Moral Agency
In philosophy, various authors have made attempts to
develop a typology of responsibility (e.g., Baier 1991;
French 1991a, b, c, d; Ropohl 1996). Moreover, the
dominantuseoftheterminthelegalspherehasshaped
all attempts to differentiate types of responsibility
(Holl et al. 2001; Bayertz 1995; see also Hart 1968).
1
Thus,‘‘responsibility’’stillisoftenusedinthesenseof
‘‘being blameworthy’’ or ‘‘being guilty.’’
However, the explanation itself provides an impor-
tanthintattheformalstructureofresponsibility:Inthe
legal context, it means a person is answerable—the
personhastorespondtoaccusationsraisedinfrontofa
court or in parliament (Holl et al. 2001). Already in
this context, responsibility turns out to be a relational
concept:Apersonisbeing held responsible byacourt/
authority regarding the blameworthy outcomes of his
or her actions and must await a judgment that implies
legal or social consequences. In other contexts,
positive outcomes and rewards can occur, too.
With this formal conception, we refer to an
analytical, meta-ethical understanding, but not to a
particular normative approach of responsibility. This
general conception explicitly denotes a relation
between several entities. At least, the concept of
responsibility requires three relata, a subject, an
object, and an instance: Someone (the subject,a sw e
will argue the moral agent) is responsible for someone
or something (the object) against someone (the
instance). However, on closer inspection, it turns out
that more—ﬁve, six, or even seven—relata are nec-
essary to reconstruct and analyze the use of the
concept responsibility in an adequate manner (Werner
2002). For the subsequent analysis of the role of
responsibility in the bioethical debate, we suggest a
conception involving seven relata:
Someone (subject) is in a particular time frame
(time) retrospectively/prospectively (temporal direc-
tion) responsible for something/someone (object)
against someone (norm-prooﬁng instance) on the
basis of certain normative standards (standard) with
certain sanctions or rewards (consequences).
We argue that this seven-relata formula covers the
most important normative aspects of different models
of responsibility in the bioethical context. In particular
contexts, more relata can be useful. With regard to this
relational conception, the relata can be interpreted as
variables: One can theoretically ﬁll in the different
categories with a particular, possibly inﬁnite number
of items. The number of possible relations in the
model is vast; they can be expressed by the formula
(n = number of items): n(A)*n(B)*n(C)*n(D)*
n(E).
With regard to the explanation of this formula, the
temporal direction and distinction between retro-
spective/prospective is fundamental for the under-
standing of responsibility. In the legal context,
responsibility is primarily discussed in a retrospective
(backward) perspective. The concept of guilt is used
to ascribe a certain course of harmful past events to
a particular person who can be identiﬁed as their
author. This retrospective concept is therefore also
called causal responsibility (Bayertz 1995: 119;
French 1991c: 113) or liability model (Young 2011:
97).
In the rise of modern society, however, a second,
prospective meaning became prominent (Bayertz
1995). According to this meaning, having responsi-
bilityforanobject,aperson,oragroupmeans beingin
charge of or taking care of future events. Prospective
(future- or forward-oriented) responsibility became
important in the context of modern functional differ-
entiation and work division which led to an increas-
ingly complex network of social roles and functions.
Furthermore, technological progress made the conse-
quences of decisions ever harder to anticipate (e.g., by
thedecouplingofplace, time,andeffects,see Strydom
1999; Bayertz 1995). Responsibility is therefore
associated with competence and/or power to decide
(ibid.). With this temporal shift, the whole normative
meaning changes (Young 2011: 76–93). Prospective
responsibility is also important in the political-philo-
sophical context. It allows expressions and justiﬁca-
tions of socio-political engagements as a forward-
oriented model of taking responsibility (ibid. 89).
1 Peter French refers to Aristotle as the classical founder of our
current use of responsibility, especially with regard to the
question under which conditions of knowledge, choice, and free
will one counts as a morally responsible person (see extracts of
Aristotle in: French 1991a: 24–38).
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Some are object to controversy with regard to moral
status, moral commitment, and justiﬁcation of norms
(see below). When it comes to bioethics, some items
are more accepted, or at least more common, than
others. Sowith regardtothecategorysubject,allitems
that can be seen as moral agents are useful. Note that
agency includes active performance of actions as well
as omissions (e.g., omitting of help for a person in a
life-threatening case) (Feinberg 1991; Held 1991).
Of course, in everyday language we also tend to say
‘‘The virus is responsible for the infection’’ or
‘‘alcohol is responsible for hepatic damage.’’ How-
ever, this way, the ideas of causality and responsibility
are confounded. While causality is an important part
of responsibility-assignments and judgments, it is
problematic to equalize both in the moral context.
There is consensus that any moral meaning of
responsibility can only be assigned to moral agents
(Yoder 2002: 24). Between different moral theories
exists, however, dissent about whether only persons or
also collectives (e.g., families, states/nations, political
groups, random groups, companies) can be classiﬁed
as moral agents (see below).
With regard to the category objects, all moral
agents can be seen as moral objects, but there can be
even more entities. For example, in bioethics, we
discuss whether human embryos, brain-dead patients,
next generations, animals, plants, or nature as a whole
(Warren 2000) can be according to their moral status
and underlying anthropologies considered as objects
ofresponsibility.Therelatumobjectalsoincludessub-
aspects of moral objects, such as the health or body of
a person, or entities understood as property of a moral
agent (e.g., the donated organ).
Withregardtothecategoryinstance,wealreadysaw
that the court (or similar legal authorities) is a well-
accepted instance. But in moral terms, we can (and
must) think of other authorities, as well, such as social
peergroups,individualconscience,orGod.Aninstance
obviously has a norm-prooﬁng (and even norm-enforc-
ing) function. It is the authority that decides whether a
norm has been met or violated and thus the correspond-
ing responsibility has been fulﬁlled or not. Some
instancesalsocanbenorm-foundinginstances,depend-
ing on assumptions based on different ethical theories.
The category standard refers to normative stan-
dards, such as moral principles or legal norms (e.g., to
respect others, avoid harm, save life, dispense justice).
These principles can be very general or very concrete
and context-speciﬁc (e.g., such professional virtues as
conﬁdentiality, trustworthiness, honesty but also such
personal values as efﬁciency or austerity). The stan-
dards depend, however, on their understanding as
duty/obligation, right, or virtue. The level of moral
commitment can differ according to the standards’
bindingness and acceptable excuses.
Finally, the categoryconsequences refers toa list of
actions or judgments that are supposed to take place if
a subject has or has not acted in a responsible way.
Some consequences are external (e.g., legal punish-
ment, economic disadvantage, social exclusion, social
power) and some internal (feelings of guilt or shame, a
bad conscience, or increased moral identity). Moral
philosophy and applied ethics (in contrast to legal
studies) have an ambiguous relationship to sanctions.
While moral philosophy lengthily debates whether an
action is morally wrong or right, only a few precepts
discuss the consequences associated with a moral
subject that does something morally wrong (Tonry
2011). The sphere of consequences is left to the social
and legal domain. However, this is no reason to
dismiss the whole concept of responsibility; our aim is
to point out that it is possible to morally assess the
actual social practice of sanctions regarding whether
they are appropriate in kind and degree.
Basic Conditions and Presuppositions of Different
Models of Responsibility
Individual and Collective Agents
The question of who counts as a moral agent is central
to the need to clarify the plausibility of a particular
constellation of responsibility. This debate can be
traced back to Francis Herbert Bradley (1991 [1876]:
62–74). His ‘‘vulgar notion of responsibility’’ can be
summarized in the insight that ‘‘responsibility implies
… a capacity for acting rationally, … to act so that
your actions can be counted on’’ (67). He also states
that ‘‘a man… is only responsible for what … issues
from an act of volition’’ (72). For Bradley, ‘‘without
personal identity responsibility is sheer nonsense’’
(73).
Harry Frankfurt and John L. Mackie contributed to
this debate by discussing the important role of choice
and intention. Mackie’s ‘‘straight rule’’ of responsi-
bility (‘‘an agent is responsible for all and only (its)
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into responsibility based on being willing to do it
(French 1991c: 129ff). For example, a physician
involved in the Tuskegee syphilis case states that he
did not have the intention to harm a patient by this
experiment; his intention was to increase helpful
knowledge for further vaccination research. Never-
theless, he can be held responsible for the effect of his
action on the patient. It therefore seems plausible to
choose being willing as the crucial criterion, rather
than intention. This concept includes all cases where a
person is willing to take some risks (e.g., harm others)
and has the necessary knowledge (or could have it).
Furthermore, this reformulation links retrospective
and prospective meanings of responsibility.
If individuals have to fulﬁll speciﬁc conditions
(such as being willing to commit an action and being
aware of possible consequences) for ascribing respon-
sibility, what does this imply for collectives? Some
philosophers doubt that collectives can ever be seen as
moral agents. For them, collectives must be seen as
aggregations of individual agents (e.g., Ladd 1991
[1984]). Hannah Arendt insisted that the liability
model of responsibility should not be applied to
collectives: ‘‘Where all are guilty, nobody is guilty.
Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is
strictly personal’’ (cited in Young 2011: 76). Her
statement has to be seen in the context of her analysis
of the Eichmann lawsuit. If we accept that Eichmann
and other Nazis can ‘‘excuse’’ their actions by
referring to collective orders they had to obey, we
lose all measures to ascribe liability and force
individuals to take responsibility.
2 However, whether
this fear justiﬁes a general rejection of the concept of
collective responsibility is questionable. Under the
impression of various ecological, medical, and eco-
nomical catastrophes such as the Bhopal disaster in
1984 or the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010,
the idea is implausible to ascribe responsibility for
wrongdoings only to the single worker, a captain, or a
CEO, while they must be explained by the interplay of
various people in a system, such as a corporative or
organized group.
One important argument that supports the idea of
collectives as moral agents points to our intuition that
sometimes the whole (a nation, a corporation) is more
than just the sum of its single parts. Those social
groups, parties, a state, or a corporation can be seen as
moral agents if their actions are based upon an espirit
de corps (Cooper 1991 [1968]: 258–259). This has to
be understood as a joint commitment, and its effect
cannot simply be explained by the aggregation of
individual actions (French 1991b, 296). The argument
gets even stronger where the members of organized
groups
3 have deliberatively chosen a collective action
(e.g., by voting or being a voluntary member of a
social group, such as a party). This group membership
should be regarded as ‘‘active’’ commitment as Young
stresses (2011: 137).
4 French calls it the ‘‘corpora-
tion’s internal decision structure … as requisite
redescription device that licenses the predication of
corporate intentionality’’ (French 1991b: 298).
French’s deﬁnition applies not only to economical
corporations but also to organized social groups, such
as political parties, nongovernmental groups, and
professions.
If we have good reasons to believe that an action
was based on the condition of a joint commitment or a
system effect that goes beyond the impact of single
actors, we can identify a collective as agent and
therefore also claim collective responsibility. This is
even more so if collectives possess economical,
structural, or political power. With the concept of
active commitment and identiﬁcation and the process
of decision-making within a group, we can further
deﬁne arelationshipbetweenindividualandcollective
responsibility. There are cases where both the indi-
vidual members and the collective can be held
responsible or only single members or only the whole.
Without a model of collective responsibility, impor-
tant moral and political considerations in the whole
2 Interestingly, this position bears a serious risk of clan liability
the other way round: Where one is judged as guilty, the
collective is acquitted.
3 Held (1991) has shown that even random social groups can be
seen as collectively responsible for not doing something. This
requires that the members of such a random group are aware of
the moral nature of a collective action (e.g., in a situation where
joining to help a single woman would protect her from rape by
two strong men, while a single person cannot be expected to
save her). However, in health care, all relevant social actors are
rather organized groups, such as professionals (physicians,
nurses), politicians, patients’ advocacy groups, stakeholders.
4 However, there are cases where group membership is not
voluntarily chosen. For example, membership in religious,
gender, or ethnic groups is often ascribed from an external point
of view. In this case, the application of retrospective and
prospective collective responsibility is problematic.
The Diversity of Responsibility 135
123debate on solidary health care or the role of profes-
sional associations, institutions such as hospitals or
patient organizations, cannot be fully articulated.
Tasks, Competence, and Capacity
An intermediary concept that relates individual and
collective responsibility is the so-called task respon-
sibility that was introduced by Hart (1968). It relies on
a socially ascribed role or relationship (e.g., a mother,
a director of a company). Hence, it is important
whethertheagentshave actively dedicatedthemselves
to the task (e.g., as professional or in a position of an
institution) or whether they ﬁnd themselves in charge
involuntarily (e.g., some family members).
Within collectives, we often deﬁne different tasks.
These tasks imply different power-positions, decision-
competences, and liabilities. Hart and Baier distinguish
task responsibility from capacity responsibility. The
latter is related to the mental and practical abilities to
perform anaction; diminished capacities can beseen as
an excuse or justiﬁcation for being less responsible.
However, the distinction between task responsibility
and capacity responsibility is not very helpful in cases
wheretasksaredeﬁneduponcapacities(e.g.,incasesof
professional responsibilities of doctors). Instead, we
suggest that by analyzing the agent, the instance, and
the norms, one will also identify and differentiate the
respective capacities and tasks.
Baier points to an interesting aspect: Any instance
presupposes a task responsibility. An instance is an
authority that has to oversee, control, and judge the
responsibility of the agents. This point is important
withregardtosocial-practical questions: Ifaninstance
has no agency power (cannot practically judge) or
cannot impose sanctions, its value as a moral instance
is questionable.
Thus, while individual conscience plays a crucial
role for our internal process of moral deliberation and
judgment, there might be cases where referring to the
psychological state of a bad conscience is insufﬁcient.
Forexample,thephrasedoctors areresponsible(only)
towards their own consciences (as a central statement
in the German professional guidelines for doctors
indicates) is very unspeciﬁc. On the one hand, it points
to the fundamental requirement of moral responsibil-
itythatphysiciansshouldreﬂectupontheirownvalues
and cannot solely rely on social norms. On the other
hand—and that would be problematic—it can be
interpreted in the sense that it is sufﬁcient if someone
feels shame because something went wrong.
DifferentLevelsofMoralStandardsandTheirRelated
Sanctions
Related to the question whether a moral agent counts
as responsible is the issue of how moral responsibility
is ascribed in terms of the underlying moral standards.
How are the moral standards related to responsibility
deﬁned andhowbindingare they?This questionrefers
to the normative complex between moral standards
(norms) and sanctions. In the following, this relation-
ship is deﬁned in terms of proportionality: The more
binding and important an underlying moral standard is
the more demanding or powerful is the sanction that
we would expect.
Furthermore, moral bindingness and consequences
differwithregardtothetemporaldirectionofanaction:
We can distinguish guilt, liability, or blame (or excuse)
in retrospective cases, and precaution, prevention, or
power and authority in prospective cases. In this sense,
retrospective and prospective responsibility are cate-
gorically different (see above). Retrospective responsi-
bility requires that something went bad or a
consequence is assessed as morally wrong (French
1991c: 135), while prospective responsibility focuses
on doing morally right or at least avoiding doing
wrongs. Nevertheless, moral actions must be under-
stood in a temporal continuum, in which backward and
future-oriented views often complement each other. As
discussedlater,prospectiveresponsibilityofpreventive
health behavior can result over time in retrospective
liability models if someone claims that person X did
not sufﬁciently prevent a disease.
The second aspect refers to the nature (or binding
character) of moral standards. Are the underlying
ethical principles—for instance to respect autonomy
or justice—seen as strict moral obligations, as prima
facie norms, or even as virtues? Generally, strict or
prima facie rules rank higher than virtues. If this is the
case, it should also have consequences for our under-
standing of responsibility: The sanctions for violating
strict rules should be seen as more demanding than for
failing virtues. By this standard, a core problem of the
various models of responsibilities can be addressed:
How well founded and binding are the underlying
norms? Andiftheyare wellfounded and binding,isthe
assumed instance the correct one to proof and
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of responsibility, we often assume that a court is the
instance to clarify guilt. But on closer examination,
variousinstancescanbeconsidered:theconscience,the
profession, the family, or the broader society.
This conceptual variety illustrates one aspect of
responsibility in comparison with other moral
approaches prominent in applied ethics that we
understand as a strength and advantage: The analysis
of explicit notions of responsibility allows and
requires a stringent analysis of the relationship
between actors and their tasks and capacities, the
underlying moral standards and their validity and
binding character, as well as the instance and its
power. This is especially necessary for applied and
concrete contexts. Hence, being responsible can be
deﬁned in terms of duty, obligation, or right or
virtue—depending on the context, but always in
relation to an agent, an instance, and the sanctions
we have in mind. While responsibility as such is a
relational term, other moral concepts, such as duty or
rights, can be seen as entitlements to treat or to be
treated in a particular way. However, especially in
modern, complex societies, they cannot deﬁne the
whole social, relational context of application and
consequences. Therefore, we argue that the proper use
of ‘‘responsibility’’ always requires a thorough deﬁni-
tion of the relata.
The Rise and Coexistence of Different Models
of Responsibility in Bioethics
Withinbioethics,theterm‘‘responsibility’’ hasitsown
particularevolution.Datingtheemergenceofthisﬁeld
(dealing not only with clinical dilemmas but also with
societal risks of life science research) back to the late
1960s, we see that ‘‘responsibility’’ was a leading
term.Sincethen,itsuseandmeaning(s)wentmanifold
paths, often overlapping each other. In the following
section, we summarize this evolution by pointing to
three paradigms.
5 We do not claim a strict historical
model of distinct stages, but different discursive
moments of dominance.
6
The ﬁrst phase was dominated by discourses of
collective forward-oriented responsibility, often
directed toward next generations, human kind in
general, and nature as such. Prominent and inﬂuential
advocates were Hans Jonas or Van Rensselaer Potter
who both expressed their moral concerns about
technology development and increasing ecological
crisis. In this context, the Asilomar Conference on
recombinantDNAmoleculesanditsrisksofbiohazard
(Berg et al. 1975) is noteworthy. Its impact on the
wider public discussion of bioethics beyond the
medical-clinical context should not be underesti-
mated. It concerns the collective (but professional)
responsibility with regard to mankind and nature.
Interestingly, the model of genetic responsibility, used
more recently as a term for biopolitical impacts on
individual life style (Lemke 2006), was coined by
Lipkin and Rowley (1974) in the early 1970s to argue
in favor of reproductive and positive-eugenic consid-
erations for collective responsibility.
The second stage, in the mid-1970s, sees the
intensiﬁed discussion of professional responsibility
towards individuals. The Belmont Report of 1976 (US
Department of Health), often considered a new
touchstone for informed consent procedures and the
legal protection of human research participants, also
deﬁned new, very precise responsibilities for
researchers.
7
The Belmont Report (as a reaction to the Tuskegee
study scandal) and the success of its theoretical
extension by Beauchamp and Childress in 1979
contributed to an understanding of professional ethos
based upon balancing various ethical principles:
respecting patients’ autonomy, beneﬁcence, non-
maleﬁcence, and justice. Both approaches refer in a
subtle and implicit way to the professional ethos of
physicians. Of course, the authors use the term
‘‘responsibility’’ in various constellations, such as
5 While our approach is based on the aforementioned formal
understandings of responsibility, Turoldo and Barilan (2007)
focus on versions of professional responsibility of scholars,
scientists, and physicians, distinguishing between context-
speciﬁc, antecedent, and humanized global responsibility (see
also Turoldo 2009).
6 It would be important to investigate also national/geograph-
ical differences between and within these stages. For example,
the discussion of individual responsibility started much earlier
in the United States while it came up in Europe after ﬁrst health
care reforms in 1990s (Ter Meulen and Ruud 2008). In other
important regions of the world, such as India, an intense
bioethical discussion about professional ethics has just started
(Tandon 2005; Srinivasan and Loff 2006).
7 See http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html
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ity,’’ ‘‘collective responsibility,’’ ‘‘community respon-
sibility,’’ but never explain the meaning nor reﬂect the
different models and their interrelations (Beauchamp
and Childress 2009: 33, 48, 83, 122, 157, 249).
The perception of professional responsibility still
dominates, especially when linked to legal discussions
of the dos and don’ts of doctors and nurses. In our
regular teaching of medical ethics, for instance, we
notice that for students professional responsibility is
synonym for being a good doctor. This popular usage
is backed by such inﬂuential organizations as the
World Medical Association, which explains in an
ethicalmanual:‘‘Whereasintraditionalmedicalethics
the sole responsibility of physicians was to their
individual patients, nowadays it is generally agreed
that physicians should also consider the needs of
society, for example, in allocating scarce healthcare
resources’’ (Williams 2009: 22). However, profes-
sional responsibility was not only an explicit model in
medical contexts, but also in other areas such as
technology assessment (e.g., Ropohl 1996; Strydom
1999).
Professional responsibility can be understood as a
backward model of liability, but also as a future-
oriented model of guidance. With regard to the more
reﬂective, forward character of professional responsi-
bility, suggestions made by Turoldo (2009) can be
cited. He understands his account of ethics of respon-
sibility as a more context-sensitive approach for
professional moral reasoning, which takes into
account charges and potential social consequences in
the treatment and communication with patients.
Athirdstadium,startinginthe1990s,dealswiththe
interrelation between social and individual responsi-
bility. This debate can be explained by two factors:
First, bioethics reacts to political reforms in which
public welfare and health care systems are cut back so
that the tasks and burdens of the individual citizen are
redeﬁned. There arose an ‘‘increase of individual
responsibility … (as) an explicit purpose of the
introduction of market forces in European health care
systems’’ (Meulen and Ruud 2008: 192). According to
the political philosopher Iris Young (2011), ‘‘a key
term helping to propel welfare reform in the United
States in the 1990s, as well as in some other reforming
states’’ was ‘‘personal responsibility’’ (10). She refers
to Schmitz who criticizes that, ‘‘it emphasizes that the
responsibility you have is for yourself and your family.
… Each must self-sufﬁciently bear the costs of its
choices, and has no moral right to expect help from
others, even if the individual or the family should
suffer harm or disadvantages’’ (Young 2011: 10).
Young’s conclusion even goes beyond the analysis of
some public health scholars. For her, the emergence of
personal responsibility has an ‘‘absolving function’’—
‘‘to pin responsibility on one agent and to absolve
others’’ (11). According to Ter Meulen and Jotterand
(2008), personal responsibility is more a policy to
control costs, but in such mid-European countries as
the Netherlands, Germany, or the United Kingdom,
the ‘‘government keeps monitoring accessibility and
quality of care. Individualization and free choice are
limited by the principles of solidarity and equity’’
(195). They contrast this interpretation to the health
care system in the United States where the strong
tradition of individualism prevails (196) and also
argue that personal responsibility does not sufﬁciently
result in free choice and autonomous decisions of the
health care consumer.
Second, internal theoretical critiques concerning
the ‘‘perversion of autonomy’’ (Gaylin and Jennings
1996) in bioethics arose, introducing moral responsi-
bility as an opponent for too much autonomy. Thus,
communitarian and feminist scholars criticized the
dominantliberalparadigmofautonomythattrumpsall
otherethicalvalues(Callahan1994;Held2006;Scully
2008). For instance, Gauthier (2002) suggests the
concept of personal responsibility as a virtue ‘‘that
strikes a balance between the individual and the
community,betweenrightsandobligations’’(276)and
emphasizes the ‘‘relationship with and obligation to
others’’ (ibid.). Patients should include the conse-
quences for their families and the community in their
deliberations about health care choices, and also the
question of who bears the costs. Gauthier’s consider-
ations are, however, very general, being unspeciﬁc
with regard to different moral objects, possible
instances, and even sanctions. In this sense, this
approach tends to use the concept of moral responsi-
bility again as a general place holder for being a moral
person. Such a generalization runs the risk of
arbitrariness or ending as rhetoric, leading to an
unjustiﬁed shallowness in the use of the term (see
above).
Thedilemma betweensocialandindividualrespon-
sibility added another point of view, especially the
controversial character of knowledge and risk
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123assessment. Yoder (2002) summarizes recent ambi-
guities of individual responsibility, especially with
regard to the increasing amount of information about
healthy life styles. He concludes: ‘‘We are told how to
improve our health or reduce our risk of illness by
eating properly, exercising regularly, or taking aspi-
rin daily. While this information empowers us, it also
burdens us. If we can control our health, we can [be]
blamed for being ill’’ (23). Yoder thus identiﬁes an
existing trend, already described 20 years earlier
(Veatch 1980). For Veatch, health care choices and
technical opportunities bear the risk that disease and
disabilities are seen as someone’s fault because
individuals, parents, or the state have omitted to do
something against the risk.
For Yoder, the crucial and problematic aspect of
dealing with responsibility is that information and
risks—the epistemic part of assessing consequences
and agency—are too often seen as a matter of
objectives facts. Instead, he pleads for a more
pragmatic perspective: First, we have to acknowledge
that there are limits in our knowledge of outcomes and
also limits in causal explanations. Second, we have to
acknowledge power distributions and how they shape
our perception and construction of responsibilities.
While Yoder does not reject the model of individual
responsibility in general, he argues that too often the
underlying values, as well as the consequences, are
assumed without further deliberation. Therefore, his
pragmatist-oriented suggestion is a move into the
public realm for the purpose of having more public
deliberations about the contribution and constitution
ofdifferent kinds ofmoral responsibility (Yoder 2002:
30).
Responsibility as Tool for Analyzing Bioethical
Dilemmas
Even the historical sketch of the evolution of respon-
sibility in the bioethical debate already reveals a deep
discrepancy: On the one hand, the word is highly
relevant in public and academic debates, but on the
other hand, its meaning and implications are quite
often far from being self-evident, or are even
controversial.
To provide a solution to this problem, two of many
practical considerations are relevant: explication and
pluralization. Explication means that the use of
‘‘responsibility’’ needs to specify the norms and
instances. As we will show, claims concerning
responsibility are often based on unclear or conﬂicting
norms, such as particular professional virtues or
universal moral principles. Also a wide range of
instances is conceivable, but not always explicitly
addressed, from individual conscience to state author-
ities. With pluralization, we demand that the roles and
responsibilities of the different agents involved in
moral conﬂicts are taken into consideration. The
formula developed above provides a tool to analyze
the meaning and role of responsibility in particular
practicalcontexts.Thejuxtapositionofdifferentforms
and levels should bring out what is predominant in the
one context and perhaps missing in the other. In the
subsequent section, we choose three prominent cases
of moral responsibility which illustrate the purpose of
our tool.
The ﬁrst case refers to organ transplantation. Here,
professional responsibilities are becoming more com-
plex as doctors acquire additional tasks and functions.
On the one hand, the individual patient is still often
perceived as the central object of the physician’s
prospective responsibility. The underlying standards
are traditional professional virtues of care and benef-
icence. They require that the doctor dedicates his or
her efforts to this single patient’s survival and well-
being for the time of treatment (Tauber 2005). On the
other hand, in the understanding of organs as scarce
resources, the physician also increasingly functions as
a gate keeper. He or she adopts the prospective
responsibility to ensure fair and efﬁcient allocation of
organs over a virtually unlimited space of time. This
practice can lead to conﬂicts on the level of standards
and objects. The new distributive responsibility is
deﬁned by temporal dimensions and public health
norms of efﬁciency and justice that are often not part
ofdoctors’traditionalprofessionalcompetence. Italso
requires doctors to distance themselves from the
individual needy person and the concrete setting of
treatment.Theynow have to envisage the collectiveof
potential recipients as the object of their responsibil-
ity. This may also involve the task to evaluate,
compare, and weigh several persons’ life expectancies
and quality of life against each other from an impartial
point of view. Such a conﬂict of responsibilities is,
however, easily neglected because the discussion of
doctors’ professional responsibilities is still mainly
conﬁned to the individual doctor–patient relationship.
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area are located on different levels of severity. While
failure to meet the traditional responsibility of benef-
icence primarily results in professional sanctions,
arbitrary discrimination regarding access to the wait-
ing list will be tried in front of court and be punished
according to criminal law (see Table 1 for summary).
The second example is concerned with responsi-
bilities emerging in the context of advance directives
(ADs). The mere legal possibility to lay down one’s
preferences, as it is now common in many Western
countries, aims at ensuring patient’s autonomy and
self-determined death. At the same time it also creates
a responsibility to take care of oneself, thus avoiding
the prospective negative consequences of depending
on the decisions of others. Additionally, ADs affect
close relatives as objects of responsibility. Surviving
family members are relieved from the insecurity
involved in making advocatory decisions over life
and death and thus are ‘‘spared the agony of not
knowing what the patient would have wanted’’
(Gauthier 2002: 279).
However, deriving from this a ‘‘moral responsibil-
ity of each member of the community to make their
wishes regarding end-of-life treatment known in
advance’’ (ibid.) does not do justice to the complexity
of the new situation. The patient’s relatives also ﬁnd
themselves to be subjects of responsibilities. They
have acquired the prospective moral (sometimes even
legal) responsibility of ensuring that the incompetent
patient’s living will is interpreted and executed
correctly. The underlying norm of this responsibility
is respect for autonomy. If the relatives fail to meet the
norm, they can lose their decision power. Therefore, it
is inappropriate to understand the individual as the
sole subject and the relatives only as the object of
responsibility. The responsibilities are mutual and the
normative standards—the principle of personal auton-
omy on the one hand, the virtue of being considerate
regarding potential psychological distress on the
other—have to be juxtaposed in order to assess their
relativeweight.Athoroughanalysisofresponsibilities
allows an understanding of the complexity of different
moral subjects and norms involved, even within one
family (see Table 2 for summary).
The third case refers to responsibility in the context
of genetic testing. Here, the term ‘‘genetic responsi-
bility’’ has gained popularity. In contrast to its initial
meaning (see above), it is now used to describe and
criticize a process of geneticization of the identity of
patients and their families but also of healthy persons
(e.g., Novas and Rose 2000; Lemke 2006). This
knowledge of being at genetic risk means that
‘‘individuals and families have a right, a duty, even a
compulsion, to choose in relation to managing the risk
of themselves and others’’ (Arribas-Ayllon et al.
2011: 5).
The preventing-risk paradigm underlying this
model must be primarily understood as a prospective
responsibility. Reﬂecting upon the risk to manifest an
inheritable disease, different proactive actions appear
possible: family planning, or in the case of such a
treatable disease as cancer, to adopt a healthy lifestyle
(Raz and Schicktanz 2009). However, the underlying
norms vary. Withinthe choice-paradigm,autonomy as
a norm would mean that genetic testing allows
individuals to choose freely (to be tested or not, to
prevent or not). The negative consequence based on a
strictautonomy-normwouldthenbetoacceptifsucha
disease occurs.
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123If autonomy is also understood as freedom to know
or not to know, no one else has the right to judge or
guide individual decisions. Therefore, suggestions in
the realm of prevention strengthening the causal and
practical need for genetic knowledge to shape
preventive campaigns and preventive medicine often
tacitly replace the norm autonomy by the norm of self-
care (Smith et al. 2005). Such self-care allows a
preventive forward-directed individual responsibility.
This is an understanding that people nowadays share.
For instance, the user of an internet forum comment-
ing on the direct-to-consumer genetics offered by
23andMe states: ‘‘Just got my 23andMe results back!
Glad I can be proactive on delaying or preventing
some of these conditions that I’m prone to’’ (http://
twitter.com/#!/23andMe/favorites/11.7.2011). How-
ever, this can easily turn into a liability model. This is
exactly the ambiguity of individual responsibility with
regard to health prevention that Yoder pointed out.
Liabilityina strong sense would meanthat individuals
are blamed for being not preventive or careful enough.
This is discussed in cases like obesity, a condition
where genetic as well as life style factors interact
(Hilbert 2008).
Moreover, genetic responsibility often does not
differentiate between the individual’s responsibility
toward himself and the one toward his family. This is
problematic. As Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2008) reveal in
their interview study, about genetic testing the major-
ity of individuals as family members practiced non-
disclosure: ‘‘The prospect of disclosure was expressed
as a practical moral burden of calculating who to
tell and when to tell them. ….’’ (11). They justiﬁed
nondisclosure in terms of their own guilt, the
possibility of incurring blame or by pre-empting a
relative’s right not to know. One of the most common
explanations for not disclosing intergenerationally
was the strong desire to protect the future autonomy
of children and young adults. Therefore, the
authors argue ‘‘for a different sense of genetic
responsibility, which is neither reducible to transcen-
dental communication nor that of rational autonomy’’
(20). They instead suggest ‘‘that people resist the
onerous obligation of managing genetic risk and
disclosing bad news to kin to escape the moral/
discursive conﬁnement of autonomy’’ (19). They
interpret this as an intensity of affect (ibid.), a pre-
discursivestrategyofthesefamilymemberspracticing
nondisclosure.
However, we take more seriously what their
informants gave as reasons. Here, norms such as
respecting the right not to know, and care for family
members to avoid socio-psychological burdens for
others and the family as whole were mentioned.
According to our analysis, those who disclose genetic
knowledge to family members do not subsequently act
uponautonomyastheleadingnorm;rather,theyacton
the norm that others have a right to know or in the case
of nondisclosure a right not to know. Within the ethics
of genetics, these norms are intensively discussed and
are also part of legal-political debates (Chadwick
2009). Therefore, different kinds of consequences can
result. Blame as well as feelings of guilt are feared by
family members, in both liability models. Long-
lasting distress within a family can result if the
persons involved favor different norms.
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123Furthermore, positive-prospective consequences
vary, too. In the case of following the norm right to
know/duty to inform, this choice results in relying on a
genetic paradigm of risk prevention and therefore
proactive health behavior for many years, even
lifelong. In contrast, following the norm not to know
will yield prospective consequences to master a
harmonic family life, often based on the task respon-
sibilitytotakethepowerofdecisions,asparentsdofor
their children, often directly after the counseling
process (Hildt 2009).
As we already see, the meaning and interpretation
of genetic responsibility is diverse, even contradic-
tory. This ambiguity can be avoided by being more
precise,detailed, and explicit about who is responsible
toward whom on the basis of which norm, proofed by
which instance, and with which consequences. As the
case of individual and family responsibility also
reveals, we have to reﬂect upon such concepts as
conscience and family communication to understand
the loci of everyday moral dilemmas of genetic
counseling.
Moreover,the case of genetic testing showsthat not
only individuals and their families are involved, but
also professionals. Professional responsibility is often
understood in terms of nondirective counseling during
treatment. However, the conﬂicts and concerns that
individuals as well as family members express invite
us to question whether the concept of nondirective
counseling is always appropriate and justiﬁed (Raz
and Atar 2003) (see Table 3 as summary).
While it is assumed it is the best standard to be
consistent to the norm of autonomy, it can easily
conﬂict over time with the norm right to know of
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123family members. If we even assume there are
preventive measures that are really easy, harmless,
and cheap to apply, nondirective counseling can be
questioned from a social responsibility point of view.
The latter wants to ensure just and fair allocation of
ﬁnancial resources to all potential patients. However,
when dealing with responsibility in a case that
involves a collective—such as a society or nation—
we need more clearness about what is the appropriate
instance to judge and evaluate norms and conse-
quences. We also need to know how to deal with long-
term effects in a political system of changing parties
and power relations. Hence, political-philosophical
considerations that seek to solve the problem by
procedural, political, or expertocratic solutions might
help (Yoder 2002).
The aim of the three cases was to illustrate the
application of the responsibility-formula-tool to struc-
turebioethicalaswellassocio-empiricalinsights.This
approach allows a comparison, detection of inconsis-
tencies, and analysis of implicit or even conﬂicting
normative relata. A next stage is the explication and
increase of consistency in justiﬁcation. None of these
analyses claims to be sufﬁcient for the ﬁelds of
application. Complexity will increase with the number
of relata to be considered. With regard to restriction in
each of these areas, it will be necessary to detect and
analyze the complexity within each of these ﬁelds.
Conclusions
‘‘Responsibility’’ is a concept commonly and prom-
inently used in academic, political, and public dis-
courses on bioethical questions, but mostly in an
underdetermined, ambiguous, or even ideologically
instrumentalized way. Therefore, its analysis consti-
tutes an important step toward a clariﬁcation of these
discourses and a critical reﬂection of the claims made.
In this sense, bioethics does not only deal with moral
problems in medical-clinical settings, it also con-
stantly includes reﬂection about the tools and concep-
tions scholars use.
Our considerations want to contribute to this
reﬂection, taking real-world needs into account.
Various concepts of responsibility can be found in
empirical contexts and even lay notions, sometimes in
a coherent, sometimes in an incoherent way. These
real-world problems need an ethical language suitable
to face, understand, and deal with social connectivity
and complexity.
In the perspective of responsibility, the use of other
meta-ethical conceptions of duties, rights, or virtues
can be integrated into a broad action-theoretical
frameworkthatforcesustoconsiderthesubject–object
relationship, time, instances, and consequences. This
perspective also allows us to cross-section differences
between deontological and utilitarian approaches that
sometimes dominate moral philosophical debates.
Furthermore, the proposed formula of responsibility
also bridges deductive (top-down) and inductive (bot-
tom-up) approaches as it invites into a discourse about
the identiﬁcation, determination, and interrelation
between subjects and objects.
‘‘Responsibility’’ is not a normative concept that
replaces ethical principles such as autonomy, benef-
icence, justice, nor does it supersede them. Without
denying the importance of personal autonomy for
bioethicsandclinicalpractice, however,responsibility
can help to complement the bioethical debate by
highlighting the normative points of view of other
actors, social groups, and society as a whole.
It should have become clear that ‘‘responsibility’’
goes beyond the debate of middle-range principles in
which many dilemmas are only understood and con-
ceptualized as conﬂicts between competing ethical
principles. This might be still true for many cases.
However, our analysis of responsibility as a tool
illustrates that the structure and context of moral
dilemmas in particular ﬁelds can (sometimes addition-
ally or also exclusively) rely on many variables,
including competing subjects, objects, consequences
aimed for, and instances. Further research has to show
that the suggested tool can contribute systematically to
the resolution of conﬂicts and dilemmas based on
insufﬁcient, implicit, or inappropriate ascriptions of
responsibility.
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